Actus et potentia
Act and potency explain how real change is possible without contradiction
Change confronts the mind with a simple but profound fact: a thing becomes what it was not yet. The cold water becomes hot; the seed becomes a tree; the student becomes knowledgeable. If the later state were already actual in the same respect, no change would occur. If it were in no way possible, change could not occur. The subject must therefore possess a real capacity for a perfection it does not yet have. Classical philosophy calls this capacity potency and the realized perfection act.
Potency is not sheer nothingness. The stone is not potentially a mathematician, while the child is. The acorn is potentially an oak in a way that it is not potentially a horse. Potencies belong to subjects through their natures and are ordered toward determinate actualities. Act is prior in intelligibility because potency is known by reference to the act it can receive. It is also prior in causality: what is merely potential cannot actualize itself precisely insofar as it lacks the actuality to be acquired.
The statement “nothing can move itself” must be read under this distinction. A living animal can move itself as a whole because one part or power actualizes another; a person can educate himself because he already possesses some knowledge, attention and will by which further knowledge is acquired. What cannot occur is that the same thing, in the same respect and at the same time, be merely potential and the adequate actualizer of that very potency. The first way rests upon this non-contradictory structure, not upon the obsolete claim that every local motion requires a hand pushing from outside.
Act and potency also illuminate limitation. A received actuality is limited by the potency that receives it: the form of heat is present according to the capacity of this subject; intellectual knowledge is present according to the finite power of this mind. A being with no passive potency would not be capable of acquiring or losing actuality. It would be pure act, free from the composition and change that mark created things. The first way will argue that an essentially ordered series of actualizers terminates in such an unmoved actualizer.
Reader path: Aristotle, Physics III · Summa Theologiae I, q. 2, a. 3 · Dedicated dossier
