Ens primum cognitum
Being is the first object of the intellect and the horizon of every later question
Whatever the mind knows, it knows under the aspect of being. Colour is a mode of being; quantity is a mode of being; relation, action, life, thought and goodness are modes of being. Even negation depends upon being: blindness is understood as the absence of sight in a subject naturally capable of seeing. The concept of being is therefore not one item beside other items. It is the most common and most fundamental intelligible note under which everything enters thought.
Being is not a genus. A genus is divided into species by differences that lie outside the genus: animal becomes rational animal when rational is added. Nothing can be added to being from outside being, because whatever is added already is in some way. The diversity of beings must therefore arise through different modes and degrees of actuality, not by adding a non-being difference to a neutral container. This is why metaphysics speaks of being analogically rather than univocally.
The beginner often hears “being” as an abstract noun meaning existence in general. Classical ontology begins more concretely: this tree is, this person is, this thought is. From such judgments the intellect recognizes that the same word is not predicated in precisely the same mode of a substance, a quality, an act and God. Yet the uses are not merely equivocal. They retain an ordered reference to actuality. Analogy allows unity without flattening difference.
This point governs the entire ascent to God. God is not placed inside the same genus as creatures as the largest specimen. He is not one being among beings, competing for space with galaxies or atoms. The proofs seek the cause upon which finite and participated acts of being depend. When they conclude to a first cause, they do not discover an invisible object within the universe. They arrive at a source transcending the whole order of caused being.
Reader path: Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia · Summa Theologiae I, q. 3-4
Prima principia
Identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle are conditions of meaningful thought
The principle of identity states that what is, is what it is. It does not forbid change; it forbids treating a subject as determinate and wholly indeterminate in the same respect. The principle of non-contradiction states that the same predicate cannot both belong and not belong to the same subject at the same time and in the same respect. Those qualifications are essential. Water can be potentially hot and actually cold, but it cannot be actually hot and actually not hot in the same respect at the same moment.
The principle cannot be demonstrated from premises more certain than itself, because every demonstration already uses it. It can, however, be defended indirectly. A denier must use words with determinate meaning, distinguish his position from its negation and intend that his denial be accepted rather than rejected. In the act of denying non-contradiction he relies upon it. Aristotle therefore calls it the firmest principle, not as an arbitrary axiom chosen by a school but as a condition of assertion, inquiry and action.
The law of excluded middle states that, for a determinate proposition under the same conditions, either it or its contradictory is true. It does not require that the investigator already know which. Nor does it turn vague language into precision. “This person is tall” may lack a fixed standard; “this person is at least 180 centimetres tall” is determinate. Much alleged paradox disappears when the proposition, time, respect or subject is specified.
Apologetic reasoning becomes corrupt when contradictions are romanticized as mystery. A mystery exceeds comprehension; it does not affirm and deny the same thing in the same respect. One divine nature in three Persons is not three natures in one nature. Christ is passible according to His human nature and impassible according to His divine nature; the predicates are not assigned in the same respect. Scholastic distinctions protect mystery from incoherence rather than dissolving it into rationalism.
Reader path: Aristotle, Metaphysics IV · Summa Contra Gentiles I