Possibile et necessarium
Contingent beings do not contain the reason for their own existence
A contingent being is not simply one whose existence is uncertain to us. It is a being whose nature does not require that it exist. Plants grow and perish; animals are born and die; stars form and cease; each could fail to exist without contradiction in its essence. The fact that a thing happens to endure for billions of years does not make its existence metaphysically necessary.
Necessity has several senses. A proposition can be logically necessary because its denial is contradictory. A natural event can be conditionally necessary given laws and conditions. A being can be necessary through another because its incorruptible mode is caused and sustained. The third way seeks a being necessary through itself, which does not receive the cause of its necessity from another.
The popular version “If everything can fail to exist, then at some time nothing existed” is often challenged because individually contingent beings might overlap eternally. The strongest Thomistic reading does not depend upon a simplistic statistical inference. A totality composed only of beings whose actuality is received remains without an intrinsic sufficient reason for actuality. Endless replacement does not transform borrowed existence into underived existence.
The argument therefore concerns the ground of actual contingent being now. If every necessary being had the cause of its necessity from another, the explanatory series would remain wholly derivative. One must arrive at a being whose necessity is not received. The later analysis identifies this necessary being with the first cause and pure act reached by the other ways, not with an abstract law or a totality of mutually dependent things.
Reader path: Third Way dossier · Summa Theologiae I, q. 2, a. 3
